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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in failing to restrict on motion 
the playing of certain video tapes containing explicit sexual 
scenes between two persons who were either cohabiting or married 
at the time of the taping. In view of defendants admission that 
the material was either harmful to minors or pornographic as 
applicable to each count in the information such ruling violated 
Rule 403 of the Rules of Evidence and denied Appellant Moore a 
fair trial. 
Appellant did not waive his 403 objection to the 
showing of the video tape by referring to the video tape during 
his opening statement and closing argument. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO> 
RESTRICT THE PLAYING OF CERTAIN 
SEXUALLY EXPLICIT VIDEO TAPES IN 
VIEW OF APPELLANTS ADMISSION THAT 
THEY WERE PORNOGRAPHIC AND/OR 
HARMFUL TO MINORS AS APPLICABLE TO 
EACH COUNT IN THE INFORMATION AND 
SUCH RULING CONSTITUTES REVERSIBLE 
ERROR. 
The State's main argument in connection with the 
playing of the sexually explicit video tape to the jury over 
appellants Rule 403 objection is new to this appeal. The 
argument is, basically, that the playing of the tape provides 
evidence relevant to Defendants state of knowledge regarding one 
of the participants age at the tiflie the tapes were produced. As 
indicated, this argument is new to the Appeal because at the time 
the Rule 403 objection was lodged with the Trial Court the only 
justification given by the State for the playing of the tape was 
that it was their belief that the Jury needed to see "all of the 
evidence". Because the State did not advance this argument in 
the court below, the State should be precluded from raising it at 
this level. 
The State's argument involves a rather interesting 
twist in connection with the facts of this case. The argument 
simply stated is that since Arvin Moore's defense was that he did 
not know that Justin Blandi was under 18 years of age at the time 
of the taping that a video tape of her performing sexual acts 
with her common law partner and/or husband is relevant to the 
issue of Arvin Moore's knowledge as to her age. 
The State's argument misconstrues the facts of this 
case. It must be remembered that the uncontroverted evidence was 
that Appellant was not permitted to attend the filming session 
between Tom and Justin Blandi, but simply allowed them to use his 
video camera and his residence. In fact the specific term and 
condition of the so called agreement between Moore and the 
Blandi's was that he not be present during the filming. In order 
to make the State's argument somewhat wash it would have to be 
proven that Arvin Moore saw Justin Blandi during the filming and 
was able to make a determination, based on a viewing of Justin 
Blandi, at the time of the filming, that she was under age. This 
is simply not the fact. Arvin Moore was never permitted to be 
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present during the filming. Therefore the only film that would be 
relevant in terms of Arvin Moore's knowledge of her age would be 
a film in which Justin Blandi was fully clothed, because that is 
the only way he saw her. 
The State suggests that the balancing analysis 
articulated in appellant's brief simply is not appropriate except 
in cases involving a homicide scene. 
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Maurer , P. 2d 
, 103 Ut. Adv. Repr. 3 (Ut. 1989) applied the Cloud and 
Garcia analysis to a letter. In Maurer the defendant while 
awaiting trial for the 2nd Degree murder of his girlfriend wrote 
a letter to the victim's father which was a rather interesting 
letter and as associate Chief Justice Howe explained in the 
opinion at 103 Ut. Adv. Repr. 4, ... 
"it displays his callousness toward the 
killing which he expresses in profane and 
vulgar language and manifests his complete 
insensitivity to this tragedy. The letter 
taunts the victim's father and was designed 
to inflict guilt upon him and add to the 
grief he must have been feeling. However, 
because of its shocking display and lack of 
remorse by defendant and the repulsiveness of 
his expressions toward the victim and her 
father, the balance of the letter may well 
have been highly inflammatory in the eyes of 
the jury." 
The Maurer case extends the rule 403 analysis beyond 
graphic homicide scenes. It also explains the rationale for the 
rule as articulated in Cloud and Garcia as follows ... 
The Supreme Ct. at 103 Adv, Repr. 5, said: 
"Our Rule 403 is verbatim to Rule 403, 
Federal Rules of Evidence, to which the 
Advisory Committee's note reads, ... 'that 
3 
cer ta in circumstances c a l l for the exclusion 
of e v i d e n c e wh ich i s of u n q u e s t i o n e d 
re levance . ' These circumstances e n t a i l r i sks 
which r a n g e a l l t h e way from i n d u c i n g 
d ic i s ion on a purely emotional b a s i s , a t one 
extreme, to nothing more harmful than merely 
wasting time, a t the other extreme." Fed. R. 
Evid, 403 advisory committees note, quoted in 
M. Graham, Handbook of Federa l Evidence 
S 4 0 3 . 1 , a t 178 (2d ed . 1 9 8 6 ) . " U n f a i r 
prejudice" within t h i s context means an undue 
tendency to suggest decision on an improper 
b a s i s , commonly, though not necessa r i ly , an 
e m o t i o n a l o n e . " I d . "In r e a c h i n g a 
d e c i s i o n whether t o exclude on grounds of 
unfair prejudice . . . {t}he a v a i l a b i l i t y of 
o t h e r means of p r o o f may a l s o be an 
appropriate f a c t o r . " Id . Graham e x p l a i n s : 
'Since a l l e f fec t ive evidence i s p re jud ic i a l 
in the sense of being damaging to the par ty 
a g a i n s t who i t i s o f fe red , prejudice which 
c a l l s f o r e x c l u s i o n i s g i v e n a more 
s p e c i a l i z e d meaning: an undue tendency to 
s u g g e s t d e c i s i o n on an imprope r b a s i s , 
commonly but not n e c e s s a r i l y an emotional 
o n e , such a s b i a s , s y m p a t h y , h a t r e d , 
contempt, r e t r i b u t i o n or h o r r o r . Where a 
danger of unfair prejudice i s perceived, the 
degree of l i k e l y p r e j u d i c e must a l s o be 
c o n s i d e r e d . The mere f ac t t h a t ev idence 
pos se s se s a tendency to suggest a decision 
upon an improper b a s i s does no t r e q u i r e 
exc lus ion ; evidence may be excluded only if 
the danger of unfair prejudice subs t an t i a l l y 
o u t w e i g h s t h e p r o b a t i v e v a l u e of t h e 
proffered evidence. Graham a t 182-83 
What Maurer sugges t s and requires i s t ha t when the t r i a l 
court i s faced with a poss ib le va l id Rule 403 objection 
to the rece ip t of evidence which may be c l ea r ly re levant but if 
r e ce ived i t may skeew the d e l i b e r a t i v e p rocess and al low a 
d e c i s i o n by the ju ry t o be based upon b i a s , sympathy, hatred, 
contempt, r e t r i b u t i o n or horror the cour t must engage in t h a t 
d i f f i c u l t Garcia and Cloud ana lys i s . Nowhere in the record does 
t h a t analys is occur. In fact there was no such ana lys i s . The 
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Court's justification for allowing the tape to be played was that 
the Court was not going to restrict either plaintiff or defendant 
in the presentation of their case. A Rule 403 objection requires 
that the Court consider interfering in the presentation of the 
State's case. That is simply the nature of a Rule 403 objection. 
In the case at bar there can simply be no question that the 
tape contained highly prejudicial material. As the Court reviews 
the tapes that were admitted and played to the Jury, it will be 
abundantly clear that any probative value that was contained in 
the tapes to show Appellants knowledge of the females age was 
clearly outweighted by the prejudicial effect the playing of the 
tape had on the Jury. 
POINT II. APPELLANT DID NOT WAIVE HIS 
OBJECTION TO THE RECEIPT OF THE 
TAPE BY REFERRING TO THAT TAPE 
DURING HIS OPENING STATEMENT AND 
CLOSING ARGUMENT. 
Counsel must admit that he has difficulty following this 
argument. The argument appears to be that since defendant 
through Counsel referred to the tapes during opening statement 
and closing argument that he waived his clearly stated objection 
to the receipt of the evidence. 
Clearly the state of the law in Utah can not be as the State 
suggests, otherwise comments on the evidence objected to would 
always constitute a waiver of a valid objection to the evidence. 
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Consider for a moment the reach of such a ruling. Suppose a 
particular graphic homicide crime scene is received in evidence 
over defendants Rule 403 objection. Suppose also that something 
about the picture suggests that the wound was self inflicted. 
The State cannot be serious in suggesting that the defendant 
cannot point those facts out in arguing the case to the Jury or 
waive his objection to the receipt of the evidence. Once the 
evidence is admitted and the Court has overruled Appellants 
objection to the receipt of the evidence Counsel would be remiss 
in not referring to that evidence during his closing argument. 
The objection was either good when it was made, or, it was not. 
Referring to the exhibit that was objected to does not constitute 
a waiver of the objection previously made. 
POINT III : THE VIDEO TAPES HAD ABSOLUTELY NO 
RELEVANCE TO CREDIBILITY AS 
SUGGESTED BY THE STATE 
The State at p. 13 in Brief of Respondent suggests that the 
video tape was admissable regarding credibility issues in the 
case. This is simply not true. The State and Appellant agreed 
on the way the videos were made, the participants, location and 
that they were made without defendant being present. The only 
dispute was whether or not a conversation occurred between the 
appellant and Tom Blandi, the husband of Justin Blandi, where-in 
Tom Blandi told Arvin Moore that his wife was under the age of 
eighteen. Appellant hotly contested that such a conversation 
occurred. There was conflicting testimony from Tom Blandi and 
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Arvin Moore regarding this issue. It is difficult to understand 
how the playing of the tapes would shed any light on the disputed 
conversation. The State does not explain in what way the tapes 
were relevant as to credibility but simply says that they were 
relevant as to that issue. Even if relevant as to credibility 
the prejudicial effect still outweighed that relevance. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated in Appellants Brief and 
for the foregoing reasons Appellant Moore requests that this 
Court reverse his convictions and either direct the lower Court 
to dismiss the action or in the alternative to order a new trial. 
DATED this day of June, 19 89 
BROWN AND COX 
By 
Kenneth R. Brown 
Attorneys for Appellant 
7 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the day of June, 
1989, a copy of the foregoing Appellant's Brief was mailed to the 
Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84114, postage prepaid. 
8 
